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Abstract: The European Union (EU) Emissions Trading System (ETS) has implicitly 
made it more expensive to bum coal relative to natural gas because coal has a higher 
carbon content. Therefore, it is important to understand how much plants reduce their 
coal usage in response to higher coal prices to assess the effectiveness of the ETS in 
reducing carbon emissions. We analyze a novel panel of coal-burning large combus-
tion plants from a subsample of eight EU countries and found that, holding constant 
the natural gas price, a 10/0 increase in the coal price results in a 0.36% decrease in coal 
consumption. At current ETS prices, this implies that the average large combustion 
plant in our sample EU countries is burning 7% less coal than it would be absent in the 
ETS. This suggests that the ETS has significantly reduced carbon emissions from coal-
fired plants for the eight countries represented in our sample. 
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1 Introduction 
With the Emissions Trading System (ETS), the European Union (EU) began the 
world's largest market-based approach to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.1 
1 There have been three phases to the program thus far. The first phase (2005-2007) covered 
the power sector and some heavy industry. The second phase (2008-2012) slightly expanded the 
reach of the program and the third phase (2013- 2020) is set to add a wide range of industrial 
activity (Newell et al. 2013). 
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The ETS places an explicit price on emitting CO2 since a covered producer is 
legally required to hold a permit for each unit of CO2 emitted. It is well known 
that burning coal emits about twice as much CO2 relative to burning natural gas. 
Therefore, the ETS is akin to raising the price of coal relative to the price of 
natural gas. A logical question then becomes, "how will a range of industrial 
plants respond when the price of coal increases due to the ETS?" We would 
expect an overall net decrease in carbon emissions if plants reduce their coal 
usage since it is more carbon intensive than its substitutes, chiefly natural gas. 
Decreasing carbon emissions is exactly the stated goal of the ETS. 
It is difficult to cleanly identify the impact of the ETS on coal usage by 
looking across plants because all plants of a similar type are subject to the same 
carbon price; there is one EU market for carbon. Furthermore, only plants of a 
certain type have been subject to the ETS in the first two phases of the program. 
However, we can gain intuition into how a range of large combustion plants 
respond to such a price on carbon by examining the changing demand for coal 
within plants as the price of coal changes over time. Utilizing a panel of EU large 
combustion plants spanning eight countries and six years, we estimate demand 
functions for coal. We find that, controlling for unobserved plant-level hetero-
geneity, demand for coal is inelastic with respect to the price of coal. Holding 
constant the price of natural gas, average coal usage decreases by around 0.31-
0.360/0 with a 10/0 increase in the price of coal. However, we also find some 
evidence of heterogeneity among the plants. Specifically, plants that have the 
ability to bum coal or natural gas may be more responsive to changes in energy 
prices than coal plants that do not have the ability to bum natural gas. 
We merge information about fuel prices and coal usage for over 250 plants 
across Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK for 
the years 2004-2009. These are the only eight countries for which we can obtain 
coal price data. Thus, we have data for large coal-burning plants representing 
roughly one-third of the EU countries. We exploit differences in fuel prices over 
time within a country to identify the responsiveness of plant level coal usage to 
changes in price. Most of these plants are electricity generating plants or com-
bined heat and power plants (CHPs) but we also have plants representing the 
sugar, paper, chemical, refinery and iron/steel industries. Furthermore, most of 
these coal-burning plants bum exclusively coal but some also bum natural gas. 
We make several contributions to the literature with this work. First, we 
examine a range of large combustion plants rather than focusing solely on the 
electricity generation sector, which has been the focus of most previous work in 
this area. This should give us a more comprehensive representation of the 
demand for coal in the EU and therefore provide more insight into how the 
average coal burning plant responds to the ETS. Additionally, we use a sample 
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of plants from eastern and western European countries rather than focusing on 
one country or region. Moreover, we utilize plant-level micro data on coal 
consumption rather than using aggregate data. This may be preferable since 
the decisions about how much fuel to use are made at the plant or firm level 
rather than the macro level. Lastly, we contribute to the growing literature on 
the effectiveness of the ETS. 
Recent economic conditions have served to decrease the price of coal within 
Europe. In response, coal usage has been on the rise in many EU countries? Our 
results suggest that coal usage would have increased even further without the 
ETS. For example, at the recent ETS allowance price of $7.00/ton, we would 
expect coal usage by the average EU large combustion plant in our sample 
countries to be about 70/0 less compared to a system with a $0 price on carbon 
emissions. In terms of emissions, this would mean that CO2 emissions from the 
average coal-burning plant in our sample are approximately 100,000 tons per 
year less than what they would be without the ETS. Thus, overall, our results 
suggest that an economic instrument that puts a price on carbon, such as a tax 
or tradable permit system, can be effective in reducing coal usage and its 
associated CO2 emissions from large combustion plants in the short run. The 
net change in CO2 emissions from large combustion plants as a whole would 
depend upon what happens to natural gas consumption and the consumption of 
alternative energy sources as coal usage decreases. 
2 Methods 
2.1 Previous Literature 
There is a growing literature on the impacts of the EU ETS and carbon taxes. For 
example, a group of papers examine the impacts on firm performance and 
competitiveness. Anger and Oberndorfer (2008) examine German firms and 
find that permit allocation did not significantly affect firm employment or 
performance. Demailly and Quirion (2008) analyze the iron and steel industry 
and find that there has not been a significant drop in competitiveness due to the 
ETS. Chan et al. (2013) examine the power and cement industries in addition to 
the iron and steel industry and find that the impact of the ETS varies by industry. 
Jaraite et al. (2014) examine Swedish plants and found that policies that put a 
price on carbon encourage environmental expenditure but not investment. 
Martin et al. (2014) found that carbon leakage risk is more related to carbon 
2 See, for example, Kopalek and Raghuveer (2013). 
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intensity than to trade exposure. Two other papers examine technological 
change in relation to a climate policy (Fontini and Pavan 2014; Martin et al. 
2011). However, there is a gap in our understanding of how plants are likely to 
respond to the ETS insofar as their fuel usage. 
A group of papers examine the fuel-switching behavior in response to changes in 
coal and other energy prices. Bopp and Costello (1990) analyze fuel switching in 
aggregate time series data from the United States using a trans-log model and 
estimate the own price elasticity of demand for coal at -0.264. Ko and Dahl (2001) 
study the US electricity generation industry and found, using a trans-log cost model 
on cross-sectional data, an estimated price elasticity of demand ranging from -0.16 
to -0.57 across the plant types and specifications. They also found evidence that 
electricity plants do substitute between different fuel types. Pettersson et al. (2012) 
analyze the fuel-switching behavior in response to changes in fossil fuel prices for 
the western European power sector. They estimate a generalized Leontif cost func-
tion on data aggregated at the country level and do not find the price elasticity of 
demand to be statistically different from 0 or -1. They do find statistically significant 
cross-price elasticities of demand between oil and gas, but not between coal and the 
other two fossil fuels. Soderholm (2001) also examined fuel switching in the western 
European power sector and finds evidence of switching behavior within multi-fired 
plants, between single-fired plants, and through conversions of existing plants. 
Estimating a trans-log cost function on a sample of 66 country-year observations 
from six countries, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and the United 
Kingdom, Soderholm (2001) finds own-price elasticities of coal ranging from -0.29 
to 0.03. However, standard errors are not reported for these estimates and Soderholm 
states that the "trans-log fuel demand system was not particularly consistent with its 
theoretical restrictions" (2001). This suggests that it is worth exploring other estima-
tion strategies for identifying elasticities. Two other papers seek to estimate demand 
functions for coal at the macroeconomic level using time-series data. Masih and 
Masih (1996) estimate coal demand in China using a double-log model on macro data 
from 1953 to 1992 and find an estimated short-run price elasticity of demand of -0.83. 
Chan and Lee (1997) also model the coal demand of China on a macro-level and find 
an estimated short-run price elasticity of demand of -0.255. 
Few studies utilize micro-level data to estimate firms' responses to changes in 
fuel prices. Tauchmann (2006) examines nine utilities in Germany's electricity gen-
eration industry from 1968 to 1998, but does not find evidence that fuel mix decisions 
are driven by fuel prices. Tauchmann (2006) argues that standard profit-maximizing 
or cost-minimizing models are not usually appropriate for highly regulated indus-
tries such as electricity because firms in these industries face restrictions other than 
price and production technology. Furthermore, Frondel and Schmidt (2002) show 
that elasticities of substitution from standard models such as the trans-log are not 
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reliable. Therefore, in our analysis, we posit a reduced-form model that does not 
depend on strong assumptions often required to identify structural parameters. This 
is similar to the approach taken by Linn et al. (2014), in which they estimate a 
reduced-form utilization function to determine the effect of coal prices on utilization 
rates of US electricity producers. Using a panel of nearly all US coal-fired electricity 
generation plants for the years 1985-2009, Linn et al. (2014) estimate the elasticity of 
the utilization rate relative to the coal price at around -0.4 across several 
specifications. 
2.2 Data Description 
In order to estimate coal demand functions at the plant level, we need to merge 
data from several sources. Data on coal usage at the plant level for the years 
2004-2009 come from the European Environmental Agency (EEA) (2012). The 
EEA has published data about the plants covered under the Large Combustion 
Plant Directive (LCPD). This directive covers plants of size 50 megawatt thermal 
(MWth) or larger, and each EU member country must track and report data on all 
such plants to the EEA. The LCPD data contain information on plant energy 
input, location, size and air emissions on an annual basis for 27 countries.3 The 
EEA has released two waves of the LCPD data, with the first wave covering 
2004-2006 and the second wave covering 2007-2009. We match the plants from 
the two waves to form a six year panel. The second wave of the LCPD data 
identified the plant industry for most of the plants. For the remaining plants, we 
searched firm websites and other databases to identify the industry. 
Energy price information at the plant level is not available so we instead 
obtain fuel prices for each country and year from the International Energy 
Agency (lEA). The IEA publishes a wide variety of information about energy 
prices in its publication and databases entitled, "Energy Prices and Taxes.,,4 
Specifically, we utilize the indices of energy end-use prices (including taxes) for 
industry. As stated by the IEA documentation, "For products where more than 
one price is available, a representative series is created for each country" (2013). 
We gather information on the indices for coal and natural gas. For the years 
3 The countries include Greece, Poland, Romania, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, France, Czech Republic, Italy, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Finland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Malta, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Luxembourg, 
Ireland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Information on energy input of individual plants is not available 
for Czech Republic, France and the Netherlands. 
4 Full information on this publication and associated databases is available at: http://www.iea. 
org/ statistics/topics/pricesandtaxes/. 
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2004-2009, the lEA provides coal indices for 8 of the countries from the LCPD 
database including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Poland, Portugal 
and the UK and natural gas indices for 14 countries from the LCPD database 
including Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain and the UK. 
The lEA states, "for coal, the industry index includes representative steam 
coal and coking coal" (2013). Furthermore, "Indices with the base year 
2010 = 100 were computed for each price series from prices in national curren-
cies and then aggregated over product groups, sectors and countries. The 
Paasche formula is used for index computation. The weights used are the 
physical quantities consumed, as published in the GECD/lEA Energy Statistics 
of GECD countries" (2014). Thus, these price indices capture the prices that large 
combustion plants actually pay in each EU country during a given year. These 
indices are available in both nominal and real terms. "To calculate the real price 
index, the nominal prices are deflated with country-specific producer price 
indices (2010 = 100) for the industry sector" (2014). We focus our analysis on 
coal-burning large combustion plants. Therefore, we define our population to be 
coal-burning large combustion plants in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
Italy, Poland, Portugal and the UK for the years 2004-2009.5 Figure 1 plots the 
energy price indices for the eight sample countries from 2004-2009. While the 
long-term trend appears to be positive for most of the countries for both coal 
prices and natural gas prices, there is certainly variation in how fast the prices 
change and in how volatile the prices are over the sample period. Furthermore, 
there are short-term increases and decreases in the prices within all the coun-
tries. As we are interested in short-term consumption decisions by plants, it is 
this short-term variation in price within a country that provides the necessary 
variation for our analysis. 
Table 1 shows the number of plants in our sample from each of these eight 
countries that burn coal in 2004. Altogether, within these 8 countries, we have 
an unbalanced panel of 274 coal-burning plants that report coal usage to the 
EEA over the years 2004-2009.6 Table 2 shows the evolution of the panel over 
the 6-year sample. The vast majority of the plants are burning only coal or only 
natural gas, with a small minority burning both fuel types. Table 3 exhibits the 
number of plant-year observations according to industry. As seen in the table, 
5 These are the only countries for which coal prices are available. 
6 There are 274 plants that report positive coal usage in at least 1 year. The number of plants in 
any given year reporting positive coal usage is less than 274. There are 258 plants for which we 
have coal and natural gas prices because lEA does not have natural gas indices for Denmark. 
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Table 1: Plants by fuel type, 2004. 
Country Plants burning only coal Plants burning coal and natural gas 
Austria 12 6 
Belgium 11 9 
Denmark 11 2 
Finland 66 14 
Italy 26 6 
Poland 82 8 
Portugal 3 0 
UK 25 6 
Table 2: Plants by fuel usage over time. 
Year Plants burning only coal Plants burning coal and natural gas 
2004 236 51 
2005 234 54 
2006 229 52 
2007 221 40 
2008 226 40 
2009 225 44 
Table 3: Plant-year observations by industry. 
Industry Plants burning only coal Plants burning coal and natural gas 
Sugar 12 6 
Paper mill 29 9 
Chemical 24 9 
Refinery 9 6 
Iron/steel 12 4 
ESI 522 92 
CHP 716 130 
Heat 3 1 
Other known 6 0 
Other unknown 38 24 
Total 1,371 281 
ESI (Electricity Supply) and CHP are the most heavily represented industries in 
our sample. 
Next, we gather information about the price of carbon emissions in the EU 
over this same time span. We obtain information about EUA futures and spot 
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prices from the EEA (2011). This provides information about daily spot and 
futures prices of the European Union Allowances (EUAs). Each EUA entitles 
the holder to emit 1 ton of carbon dioxide equivalent gas. The spot price is 
likely the best measure of the short-run price on carbon, and therefore most 
relevant for day-to-day decision making about which fuels to burn. In contrast, 
the futures price is likely the best measure of the long-run price on carbon and 
would be the best measure for firms to consider when making their decisions 
about what type of plants to build or upgrade. For a given day, there are 
multiple futures contracts that could be traded. For example, in January 2005, 
one could have traded 2005, 2006 or 2007 EUA futures. In September 2007, one 
could have traded 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 or 2012 EUA futures. The futures 
contracts of varying years differ slightly at any given point in time, but are 
heavily correlated. Thus, for any given date, we average the prices of the futures 
contracts that one could have traded. We average the daily prices over the span 
of the year to come up with annual carbon spot and futures prices. These carbon 
prices are common to all countries in the EU for a given year. In normal 
circumstances, the spot and futures prices will move in the same direction. 
However, the spot price diverged from the futures prices at several points 
throughout these seven years. The most notable divergence occurred in 2007 
due to a series of events. As explained by Newell et al. (2013), initial limits were 
established without reliable data and modest in aim, it became apparent in 2006 
that there was a considerable oversupply of permits, and allowances could not 
be banked for future phases of the program. Table 4 shows these prices that we 
construct for the years 2005-2009. 
The share of renewable energy utilized in an economy can affect coal 
consumption because this can affect the merit order of plants.? Thus, we gather 
the share of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption from Eurostat 
Table 4: ETS carbon prices by year. 
Year EUA spot price EUA futures price 
2005 €21.82 €18.l5 
2006 €17.27 €19.05 
2007 €0.65 €15.40 
2008 €11.13 €24.00 
2009 €13.l7 €14.2l 
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point. 
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at the country-year level. Finally, we gather information about economic activity 
at the country level from Eurostat (2014). Clearly, fuel use will increase when the 
economy is producing more goods and services so it is important to control for 
the level of output in the analysis. As our measure of macroeconomic activity, 
we utilize country-level real GDP per capita (measured in Euros). Table 5 
presents summary statistics for all of our variables. 
Table 5: Summary statistics. 
Variable Mean Std. dey. Min. Max. n 
Coal, TJ 15,665.2 30,094.5 0.8 280,776.2 1,371 
Natural gas, TJ 143.84 869.40 0.00 12,521.18 1,371 
Coal price 79.92 17.04 47.34 117.51 1,371 
Natural gas price 84.90 20.82 49.62 140.72 1,302 
EUA spot price 12.94 7.08 0.65 21.82 1,135 
EUA futures price 18.18 3.39 14.21 24.00 1,135 
MWth 1,036.4 1,652.0 50.0 12,600.0 1,336 
Real GDP/capita (thousand €) 21.94 11.51 6.20 39.90 1,371 
Renewable energy share 14.57 11.12 1.2 31.3 1,371 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
We are mainly interested in how large coal-burning plants respond to changing fuel 
prices in the short term. There are several testable hypotheses that emerge. First, the 
basic theory of the firm says that, as an input price increases, the firm will use less of 
that input. At the same time, coal is a crucial input for many of these plants because 
it is needed for the combustion process; they do not have the option of substituting 
a different fuel such as natural gas. Therefore, we may well expect that demand for 
coal will be inelastic with respect to price for many of these plants. 
There is likely significant heterogeneity across plants in their responsiveness 
to changes in the price of coal relative to natural gas. For example, operators of 
brown coal burning power plants are often also the extractors of the nearby 
lignite reserves used to power the plant. These operators may well be much less 
responsive to changes in fuel prices than other operators who are more inte-
grated with regional and global energy markets. Nevertheless, we note that we 
are most interested in the average plant responsiveness to changes in the coal 
price because this is most relevant for policymakers. That is, to assess the 
effectiveness of the ETS in reducing overall coal consumption of large combus-
tion plants, we need to include plants representing the entire population of large 
combustion plants in our sample countries. 
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Furthermore, multi-plant firms own many of these coal-burning plants. To 
take the example of the electricity supply industry, firms often own coal and 
natural gas fired power plants. As explained in Soderholm, "Changes in fossil 
fuel prices can change the merit order of plants using different fuels" (2001). 
Thus, the decision of which plants to dispatch on a given day will depend on the 
demand for electricity as well as the relative prices of the fuels. As coal increases 
in price, we would expect firms to scale back on electricity production from coal-
fired plants and ramp up production from natural gas plants. Similarly, as 
natural gas increases in price, we would expect firms to utilize their coal-fired 
plants more heavily. Price signals from natural gas and coal can be important to 
the decisions of plants even when the plant itself only has the ability to burn one 
specific type of fuel. That said, plants that do have the ability to switch between 
natural gas and coal should be more responsive to changes in price than plants 
that do not have the ability. Thus, we split the sample into two groups; the 
plants that never burn natural gas comprise one group and the plants that burn 
natural gas in at least one of the years make up the other group. Table 6 
summarizes the characteristics of the two subgroups. Of the 184 plants in the 
subgroup that never burns natural gas, 173 are energy utilities. Of the 74 plants 
in the subgroup that do burn natural gas, 58 are energy utilities. The plants that 
never burn natural gas also tend to be somewhat larger than plants burning 
both fuels, both in terms of capacity and coal consumption. 
As explained earlier, the ETS began in 2005. Placing a price on carbon 
effectively makes burning coal more expensive than burning natural gas since 
CO2 emissions are higher from coal. We examine annual coal usage, so the spot 
EVA price is likely the best measure of the price premium for burning coal 
relative to natural gas. Therefore, we predict that increasing spot EVA prices will 
Table 6: Summary statistics of fuel subgroups. 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. n 
Plants burning caal and natural gas 
Coal, TJ 12,143.8 20,870.3 0.8 140,023.0 358 
Natural gas, TJ 550.85 1,635.78 0.00 12,521.18 358 
MWth 914.7 1,504.4 50.0 6,400.0 348 
Energy utility 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00 358 
Plants never burning natural gas 
Coal, TJ 16,909.7 32,657.0 1.1 280,776.2 1,013.0 
Natural gas, TJ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,013.00 
MWth 1,079.3 1,699.6 54.0 12,600.0 988.0 
Energy utility 0.94 0.23 0.00 1.00 1,013.00 
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lead to plants burning a smaller quantity of coal. It is uncertain whether 
increasing EVA futures prices will lead to immediate reductions in coal usage. 
It is more likely that one would observe EVA futures prices affecting the decision 
about what types of new plants to build. 
2.4 Empirical Strategy 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate demand functions for coal where we assume 
that demand for coal depends on the coal price and the natural gas price as well 
as other controls.8 Recall that most of the plants burn either coal or natural gas, 
but not both fuels. However, it is certain that many of these plants are owned by 
parent companies that operate both coal and natural gas plants. Thus, it is 
important to control for the price of natural gas in the analysis. We take the 
natural logs of all variables to facilitate an elasticity interpretation. We acknowl-
edge that there likely is substantial unobserved heterogeneity across plants and 
that coal usage likely changes over time for many reasons that are unobservable 
to us. Thus, for our base specification, we have 
In coalit = fJo + fJJln CPit + fJ)n NPit + fJ3ln MWthit + fJ4GDP / capitait 
+ fJsRESit + (Xi + It + cit , 
[1] 
where CP is the real coal price, NP is the real natural gas price, MWth is the thermal 
capacity of the plant, RES is the country-level renewable energy share, (Xi are plant-
specific time-invariant effects, It are year fixed-effects and c it are iid error terms for 
plant i in year t. If the plant-specific effects are correlated with the energy prices 
and constant over time, we should use the fixed-effects model to produce consistent 
parameter estimates? If, however, the plant-specific effects are uncorrelated with 
the energy prices, the random effects estimator will give consistent estimates and 
will be more efficient than the fixed effects estimator. We are using plant-level data 
on coal usage and country-level prices so, as long as the plants are small enough 
8 If our dependent variable (coal consumption) is integrated and our energy prices are inte-
grated, we could have a problem with spurious regression. We aggregate coal consumption to 
the country level to form a balanced panel and conduct a Harris- Tzavalis (HT) test using 
STATA's xtunitroot command. We reject the null of the coal consumption series containing 
unit roots with a v·value of 0.0008 and conclude this series is stationary. 
9 There are certainly other plant level omitted explanatory variables that determine the level of 
coal consumption such as plant age and efficiency. We do not have any information on these 
variables. However, within a fixed·effects framework, these omitted variables will not bias the 
estimated coefficients of interest on the fuel prices as long as the omitted variables are not 
changing over time in ways that are correlated with fuel prices. 
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relative to the overall coal demand within a country, the actions of one plant will 
not change the price variable very much. In other words, the price variable may 
well be largely exogenous to the plants. Nonetheless, there could be plant-specific 
effects that are correlated with the independent variables and the error term, so we 
estimate eq. [1] with both fixed effects and random effects models. 
The EVA spot and futures prices vary only across years and not across 
plants or countries. Thus, it is not possible to identify a model with year fixed 
effects in this case. Nevertheless, we are interested in whether the spot and 
futures prices have a different effect on coal usage so we investigate a second 
model that controls for economic activity. Therefore, our model is, 
In coalit = flo + flJln CPit + fl2ln NPit + fl3ln MWthit + fl4GDP / capitait 
+ flsln EVA_Spott + fl6ln EVA_Futurest + fl7RESit + (Xi + cit , 
[2] 
where EVA_Spot is the EVA spot price, EVA_Futures is the EVA futures price, (Xi 
are plant-specific time-invariant effects, and cit are iid error terms for plant i in 
year t. Again, we estimate eq. [2] with both fixed effects and random effects 
models. 
The inclusion of the country-level renewable energy share, RES, in eqs [1] 
and [2] is debatable. On one hand, this variable can control for some of the 
exogenous variation in country level energy policy. For example, renewable 
portfolio standards/renewables obligations in some sample countries legislate 
that a certain percentage of a country's electricity must come from renewable 
sources. Changes to these laws are exogenous to the decision-making of indivi-
dual plants so, to the extent that the RES variable measures these laws, it is a 
valid exogenous control variable. In this case, the omission of the RES variable 
could bias our estimates because RES can affect the merit order of electricity 
plants. However, it can also be argued that the country-level renewable energy 
share is an outcome of the fuel choices of individual plants in a given country. 
This can especially be a concern for smaller countries where the electricity 
supply is more highly concentrated. In this case, the inclusion of the RES 
variable could bias our estimates. In light of these possibilities, we estimate 
specifications both with and without the RES variable. We report results for the 
models that include RES and note that estimates of other coefficients change 
only slightly when excluding RES.1O 
There are several econometric issues that merit attention given the nature of 
our data including correlated error terms and measurement error. Recall that the 
price variation is at the country level and the coal demand variation is at the plant 
10 We conducted this robustness analysis for all results in the paper. 
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level. Thus, there could be correlated errors for plants within a country for a given 
year. Ignoring this would result in biased standard error estimates. This is the 
classic Moulton problem (1986) and the appropriate method to produce consistent 
standard error estimates if errors were independent over time would be to cluster 
standard errors at the country-year level. However, there is likely also serial 
correlation within countries. For example, a negative economic shock in Italy in a 
given year is likely to persist over time and influence coal demand for plants in Italy 
in subsequent years. This serial correlation in clustered panels can also lead to 
inference problems if unaddressed. One appropriate solution is to cluster at the 
country level rather than the country-year level (Angrist and Pischke 2009)Y 
Therefore, we report STATA (2011) clustered standard errors at the country level 
for all regressions. 
Ideally we would have data on the actual price paid by each plant rather 
than country level price data. However, to our knowledge, these data do not 
exist. With country level price data, we have measurement error in our energy 
price variables. We may expect that this measurement error has a mean that is 
close to 0 because the country level price from the lEA is formed by taking a 
representative average of the prices paid. Thus, within a given country, some 
plants will have actually paid more than the country average and some will have 
paid less than the average. So, the observations where we are using "too high" a 
coal price should about balance with the observations where we are using "too 
low" a coal price. If this is the only variable with measurement error, then we 
would have an attenuation bias. That is, the direction of the inconsistency of our 
estimate on the coefficient would be toward o. Even if there is measurement 
error on other variables, the direction of the inconsistency would still be toward 
o as long as the measurement errors on different regressors are independent 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005). Thus, we view our estimates of the coefficients on 
the coal price and the natural gas price as lower bounds (in absolute value) of 
the true parameter values. This implies that the large combustion plants are at 
least as responsive to a change in the energy prices as we report. So, in reality, 
large combustion plants may cut their coal usage by an even greater amount 
when the price of coal increases. 
A final concern is that our log-log specification drops the observations for 
which coal usage is zero. For multi-fuel plants that use coal in some years but 
not others, this creates an endogenous sample selection problem and we would 
understate their sensitivity to changes in the price of coal. This would bias our 
coefficient on coal price toward o. That is, to the extent that there is a sample 
11 Hansen (2007) finds that STATA clustered standard errors are rather good at correcting for 
serial correlation in panel data, even with a relatively small number of clusters. 
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selection problem, it would work against us finding statistically significant results. 
However, there are relatively few multi-fuel plants that bum coal in at least one 
year and report zero coal usage in any other year in our data. Only 37 of the 258 
sample plants report both positive and zero coal usage throughout the sample 
period. As a robustness check, we estimate the model excluding these 37 plants. 
3 Results 
3.1 Full Sample 
We begin by estimating eqs [1] and [2] using our full sample of 258 plants. 
Table 7 shows results for eq. [1]. We present results for both the fixed effects and 
random effects estimators for comparison, but note that a test of fixed versus 
random effects finds strong evidence to reject the random effects model. 12 
Therefore, the estimates from the random effects model are not consistent and 
we rely on the fixed effects estimates. Controlling for the size of the plant, a 10/0 
increase in the price of coal is expected to lead to a 0.307-0.356% reduction in 
the amount of coal consumed. This coefficient is significantly different from 0 
and also significantly different from 1. Therefore, we conclude from this first set 
of regressions that coal demand is inelastic with respect to price. Furthermore, 
the cross-price elasticity between coal and natural gas is estimated between 
0.402 and 0.514 and there is evidence that this cross-price elasticity is statisti-
cally different from o. Therefore, as the price of natural gas increases by 1%, we 
expect coal usage to increase by around 0.4-0.5%, indicating that there is 
substitution between the two fuels at the plant level. Coal usage increases within 
a plant as the capacity of the plant (MWth) increases. However, the relationship 
is not one-to-one; a 10/0 increase in plant capacity is associated with a 0.45-
0.46% increase in coal consumption in specifications (1) and (2) from Table 7. 
Table 8 presents the results for eq. [2]. We once again find strong evidence to 
reject the random effects model so we focus on interpreting the fixed effects 
results. The estimated coefficients on In Coal Price are about twice as large as 
the corresponding estimates from Table 7 (eq. [1]). We do not find significant 
results on either EUA price for any of the fixed effects regressions. This is 
perhaps not surprising; there is little variation to work with here since the 
EUA prices are common to all plants throughout the EU for a given year. 
12 We utilize the STATA user-written xtoverid test (Schaffer and Stillman 2011) which uses the 
artificial regression approach described in Arellano (1993). This is the appropriate test in place 
of the Hausman test when using clustered standard errors. 
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Table 7: Regression results for the full sample (eq . [1]). 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects 
In Coal Price 
In Natural Gas Price 
In MWth 
Real GDP/capita (th. €) 
Renewable energy share 
Constant 
Year·fixed effects 
Observations 
Number of plants 
-0.307** 
(0.119) 
0.402* 
(0.201) 
0.462** 
(0.134) 
5.331*** 
(0.676) 
Yes 
1,300 
258 
-0.356** 
(0.142) 
0.514** 
(0.201) 
0.452*** 
(0.139) 
0.0313 
(0.0292) 
0.0613 
(0.0359) 
3.684*** 
(0.918) 
Yes 
1,300 
258 
-0.440*** 
(0.150) 
0.457*** 
(0.170) 
1.180*** 
(0.0767) 
1.130** 
(0.551) 
Yes 
1,300 
258 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
-0.397*** 
(0.116) 
0.365 
(0.229) 
1.143*** 
(0.0885) 
0.00703 
(0.00765) 
-0.0119 
(0.00949) 
1.571** 
(0.605) 
Yes 
1,300 
258 
Furthermore, not all plants were subject to the ETS regulations during our 
sample period. Recall that the first phase of the program was limited in scope 
so many of the plants would not have been factoring in the price of carbon. 
The difference in the estimated demand elasticities with respect to coal price 
between Tables 7 and 8 can be explained with further examination of the time 
trend in coal consumption. In estimating eq. [1] (Table 7), we use 2004 as our 
omitted comparison year for the time-fixed effects. Coefficients on all other year 
fixed effects (2005-2009) are negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, 
the time-fixed effects coefficients increase in absolute magnitude for each suc-
cessive year. This suggests that there was a negative trend in coal consumption 
across our sample countries over the sample period. At the same time, Figure 1 
revealed that the long-term trend of coal prices was positive for most of our 
sample countries during this same time. Recall that we cannot identify the 
model in eq. [2] when including time-fixed effects. Thus, to the extent that 
GDP/Capita and the EUA prices do not capture shocks common to Europe in a 
given year, the coefficient on coal price will be biased upward (in absolute 
value) in eq. [2] (Table 8). That is, unobserved factors contributing to trends in 
coal consumption are misattributed to the price of coal in eq. [2], making it seem 
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Table 8: Regression results for the full sample (eq. [2]). 
Variables 
In Coal Price 
In Natural Gas Price 
In MWth 
In EUAJuture 
Real GDP/capita 
(th. €) 
Renewable energy 
share 
Constant 
Time trend 
Observations 
Number of plants 
(1) 
Fixed 
effects 
-0.640* 
(0.280) 
0.159 
(0.251) 
0.471*** 
(0.108) 
-0.0165 
(0.0233) 
0.308 
(0.181) 
6.706*** 
(0.537) 
1,075 
253 
(2) (3) 
Fixed Random 
effects effects 
-0.657** -0.642** 
(0.265) (0.282) 
0.0143 0.215 
(0.271) (0.256) 
0.458*** 1.151 *** 
(0.116) (0.0614) 
0.0160 -0.0186 
(0.0207) (0.0243) 
0.139 0.321 * 
(0.150) (0.176) 
0.0758** 
(0.0237) 
0.00904 
(0.0268) 
6.185*** 2.167*** 
(0.586) (0.311) 
1,075 1,075 
253 253 
(4) 
Random 
effects 
-0.600** 
(0.275) 
0.185 
(0.266) 
1.141 *** 
(0.0870) 
-0.0129 
(0.0238) 
0.271 
(0.184) 
0.0122* 
(0.00648) 
-0.00851 
(0.00799) 
2.173*** 
(0.360) 
1,075 
253 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
(5) 
Fixed 
effects 
-0.513* 
(0.229) 
0.311 
(0.260) 
0.439** 
(0.121) 
-0.00761 
(0.0201) 
0.0815 
(0.148) 
0.0593** 
(0.0210) 
0.0593 
(0.0360) 
153.805* 
(69.54) 
-0.0746* 
(0.0352) 
1,075 
253 
as though plants are more sensitive to short-term movements in the price of coal 
than they actually are. If this argument holds true, adding a linear time trend 
should help to reduce the extent of the bias. This is precisely what we see in 
Column 5 for the plant-fixed effects model with a linear time trend.13 Hence, 
these results without time-fixed effects are likely unreliable and we proceed 
considering only results from eq. [1] (Table 7). 
3.2 Subsample of Only Energy Utilities 
One issue for the comparability of our results is that our sample includes plants 
from sectors other than the energy industry, whereas most previous work 
13 Random effects results adjust similarly and are available upon request. 
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Table 9: Regression results for energy utilities only. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed effects Fixed effects Random effects Random effects 
In Coal Price 
In Natural Gas Price 
In MWth 
Real GDP/capita (th. €) 
Renewable energy share 
Constant 
Year·fixed effects 
Observations 
Number of plants 
-0.325* 
(0.136) 
0.370 
(0.242) 
0.471** 
(0.144) 
5.545*** 
(0.656) 
Yes 
1,179 
231 
-0.353* 
(0.146) 
0.514* 
(0.231) 
0.466** 
(0.144) 
0.0126 
(0.0279) 
0.0696* 
(0.0345) 
3.878*** 
(0.963) 
Yes 
1,179 
231 
-0.456*** 
(0.161) 
0.415** 
(0.197) 
1.183*** 
(0.0698) 
1.358*** 
(0.482) 
Yes 
1,179 
231 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. 
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
-0.422*** 
(0.119) 
0.349 
(0.265) 
1.154*** 
(0.0885) 
0.00454 
(0.00839) 
-0.00840 
(0.0110) 
1.690** 
(0.685) 
Yes 
1,179 
231 
concentrates on the energy sector. Therefore, we also analyze the subs ample of 
large combustion plants in the energy industry.14 As shown in Table 9, the main 
results on the energy price variables remain statistically significant with only 
slight changes in the estimated coefficients. Thus, we are reasonably confident 
that our results are not being driven by non-energy sector plants. 
3.3 Analysis by Fuel-Switching Capabilities 
As covered in the data description, some of the sample plants burn both coal 
and natural gas over the 6 years of the panel while some plants never burn 
natural gas. One would expect that plants with the capability to burn either 
fuel would be more sensitive to changes in the two fuel prices. Here, we split 
the sample into the two subgroups and estimate eq. [1] utilizing the same 
fixed effects model that we run on the full sample. Table 10 shows the 
results for these two subgroups. As would be expected, the point estimates 
14 We define the energy industry to be all ESI and CHP plants. 
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Table 10: Regression results, split by fuel-switching capability. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Plants burning cool and natural gas "lants never burning natural gas 
In Coal Price -0.375*** -0.399** -0.176 -0.268 
(0.0875) (0.148) (0 .142) (0.158) 
In Natural Gas 0.590** 0.595** 0.295 0.517 
Price (0 .189) (0.195) (0 .333) (0 .336) 
In MWth 0.0174 -0.0703 0.604*** 0.622*** 
(0.0672) (0 .0762) (0 .145) (0.135) 
Real GDP/ capita 0.0850* 0.0131 
(th. €) (0 .0402) (0.0240) 
Renewable energy 0.0353 0.0860* 
share (0.0382) (0.0382) 
Constant 7.291 *** 5.853*** 4.398*** 2.333 
(1.165) (0.684) (1.115) (1.272) 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 339 339 961 961 
Number of plants 74 74 184 184 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. 
All results are from the plant-fixed effects model. ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. 
are larger in magnitude for the plants that report burning both natural gas 
and coal. Furthermore, the coefficients on coal price and natural gas price 
are statistically different from 0 for the plants that burn both natural gas and 
coal whereas the coefficients are not different from 0 for the subgroup that 
never burns natural gas. We conduct a Wald test for differences in the 
coefficients on In Coal Price from the two subs am pIes and fail to reject the 
null of equality at conventional levels (v-value = 0.192).15 Also, the point 
estimates of the coefficients on the energy prices for the plants that never 
burn natural gas are of the same sign as in the other results. This is 
consistent with the idea that there may be some fuel switching that occurs 
at the firm level even when individual plants do not have the ability to 
switch fuels, but not enough for us to find a statistically significant effect 
with our sample size. Given that 940/0 of these plants that burn only coal are 
energy utilities, the fuel switching is likely related to changing the merit 
order of electricity-producing plants. 
15 We implement this test using STATA's (2011) seemingly unrelated regression (suest) frame-
work, clustering at the country level. 
1500 - A. Meyer and G. Pac DE GRUYTER 
3.4 Robustness Check on Sample Selection 
As a final robustness check, we exclude the plants that report positive coal 
consumption in at least one year and 0 coal consumption in at least one year; 
this drops 37 plants from the analysis. Again, the concern here is that we could 
have endogenous sample selection because multi-fuel plants decide whether or 
not to burn a nonzero amount of coal in each sample year, and should they 
choose to not burn any coal, our log-log specification will exclude them from the 
sample. Table 11 shows results for this reduced sample. The results in column 1 
are quite similar to those found in column 2 of Table 7 for the full sample. The 
point estimate on In Coal Price is slightly larger in magnitude for this reduced 
sample compared to the full sample, consistent with the idea that any endogen-
ous sample selection would bias our coefficient toward 0 in the full sample 
analysis. The same pattern is seen for the plants that burn natural gas and coal 
as well. In summary, the responsiveness of coal burning large combustion 
plants to changes in energy prices appears robust to potential sample selection 
issues. 
Table 11: Regression results for subgroup of plants always reporting positive coal usage. 
Variables 
In Coal Price 
In Gas Price 
In MWth 
Real GDP/ capita 
(th. €) 
Renewable energy 
share 
Constant 
Year·fixed effects 
Observations 
Number of plants 
(1) 
All plants in 
subgroup 
-0.361 * 
(0.149) 
0.440 
(0.241) 
0.564*** 
(0.0732) 
0.0309 
(0.0231) 
0.0593 
(0.0362) 
3.458*** 
(0.706) 
Yes 
1,193 
221 
(2) (3) 
Plants burning coal and Plants never burning 
natural gas natural gas 
-0.481** -0.209 
(0.147) (0.140) 
0.577*** 0.341 
(0.126) (0.379) 
-0.0609 0.750*** 
(0.0714) (0.141) 
0.0942* 0.0125 
(0.0438) (0.0170) 
0.0291 0.0710 
(0.0333) (0.0395) 
5.742*** 2.308 
(0.648) (1.973) 
Yes Yes 
290 903 
55 166 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the country level. 
All results are from the plant-fixed effects model. *** p < 0.01, ** P < 0.05, * P < 0.1. 
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4 Discussion 
We have shown that large coal combustion plants in Europe are inelastic in their 
demand for coal and tend to increase coal consumption when the price of 
natural gas increases relative to the price of coal. In this section, we explore 
the magnitude of our results given the prevailing economic conditions in 
Europe. Note that the ETS carbon price is not reflected in the prices we have 
used from the EIA. Therefore, we need to be clear about our assumptions on 
plant behavior. We assume that firms are pricing in the cost of burning carbon 
over and above the prices reflected in the EIA data. That is, we assume that 
plants consider how much they will have to pay for the EUAs when they make 
their fuel purchase decisions. All of the following analysis is based on the 
average results found from the full sample. We have shown that there is 
heterogeneity among plants in their responsiveness to changes in energy prices. 
Furthermore, the conversion factors that we use are averages so these estimates 
are meant to give a rough idea of the economic scale of the average results. 
We use the following logic in order to link changes in the EUA price to 
changes in coal usage. Whenever the EUA price increases (decreases), the 
implicit price of coal relative to natural gas increases (decreases) because coal 
is a more carbon intensive fuel than is natural gas. We use conversion factors to 
determine how much carbon dioxide is released from one unit of energy for both 
coal and natural gas. This allows us to get an idea of how much it costs above 
the market price of the fuel itself to burn one unit of coal or one unit of natural 
gas at current EUA prices. We then use this information to determine how much 
the implicit prices of coal and natural gas have changed. Finally, we use the 
results of our econometric analysis to translate these changes in the implicit 
prices to changes in coal usage. 
According to the EIA, 3.67 tons of carbon dioxide contain one ton of carbon. 
Also, depending on the type, coal ranges from approximately 600/0 to BO% carbon 
content; we assume a midpoint of 70% for this analysis. Thus, an EUA spot price 
of €7.00 per ton of CO2 would translate into approximately €lB.OO per ton of coal. 
Relative to an EU spot price of €70.00 per ton of coal, this represents about a 25% 
addition to the implicit price of coal. Likewise, using EPA conversion factors 
(2014), the recent EUA spot price of €7.00 per ton of CO2 is equivalent to €0.37/ 
MMBtu of natural gas. At the EU import price on natural gas of €B.90/MMBtu, a 
EUA spot price of €7.00 per ton of CO2 has increased the implicit price of natural 
gas by 4.1%. A 10% increase in the price of coal would be approximately 
equivalent to a EUA spot price of €2.BO per ton of CO2 and a 100/0 increase in 
the price of natural gas would be approximately equivalent to a EUA spot price of 
1502 - A. Meyer and G. Pac DE GRUYTER 
€17 per ton of CO2• Thus, using the point estimates from Column 2 of Table 7, the 
net effect of a €7.00 per ton price on CO2 would be equal to -0.356 x 25 + 0.514 
x 4.1 = -6.790/0. That is, as a rough estimate and on average, we expect that 
large coal-burning plants in our sample countries are today using approximately 
7% less coal than they would be using absent the EU ETS. 
Next, we investigate the implications for changes in carbon dioxide emis-
sions due to this decrease in coal consumption. Given the information from the 
EIA, and assuming complete combustion of the coal, we can expect that each 
unit of coal burned will lead to 2.59 units of carbon dioxide. The average coal-
burning plant in our sample burns 15,665.2 TJ, which is equivalent to about 
534,510 tons of coal on an annual basis. A 7% reduction in the amount of coal 
consumed would be a reduction of 37,416 tons of coal for the average plant in 
our sample. Therefore, we expect a carbon price of €7.00 per ton to save on the 
order of 96,907 tons of CO2 for the average plant from reduced coal usage. 
However, this is surely not the net effect of the policy. Some of the reduction 
in emissions from coal will be offset by an increase in emissions from natural 
gas and other carbon emitting fuels. The extent of the offsetting increase in 
emissions from these other fuel sources in important to study, but beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
The share of overall EU carbon emissions caused by large combustion plants 
is sizeable. A report from the EU Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
Bureau (Best Available Techniques Reference Document for the Large Combustion 
Plants, 2013) states that large combustion plants accounted for 65% of the CO2 
released from all plants covered by the Industrial Emissions Directive in the EU-15 
in 2001, as reported by the European Pollutant Release and Transfer Register. 
While clearly not all EU large combustion plants burn coal, this helps to give a 
magnitude to the carbon emissions from large combustion plants relative to all 
other plants. Also, recall that the majority of the plants in our sample are 
electricity generating plants or CHPs. Restricting attention to the electricity and 
heat production industries in the EU-27, 65.80/0 of total industry CO2 emissions 
were a result of burning coal in 2011 (Mandl, 2013). Therefore, reducing the 
amount of coal that is burned by large combustion plants could have a substantial 
effect on overall CO2 emissions within our sample countries. 
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
It is important to understand how coal-burning plants respond to changes in 
energy prices for a variety of reasons. Coal producers would want to know this 
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information in planning for the future. Also, one of the main uses of coal is for 
producing electricity. Governments hold significant concern about electricity for 
political and economic reasons; therefore governments would be interested in 
knowing how plants respond to policies that add to the price of coal relative to 
natural gas. Finally, the EU has formulated public policy, namely the ETS, to 
reduce the amount of carbon emissions. The effectiveness of the EU ETS pro-
gram will depend in part upon how responsive combustion plants are to 
increases in the price of carbon-intensive fuels. 
One significant challenge in assessing the response to increases in the price 
of carbon via the ETS is that there is one ETS price throughout the entire EU. 
Thus, we cannot rely on cross-sectional variation in the price of carbon. Also, 
any other factors that are changing at the same time as the ETS and affecting 
carbon prices would confound our estimates. We avoid this problem by match-
ing plant-level coal usage with coal prices that vary across eight countries over a 
period of 6 years and controlling for time effects. Plant responsiveness to 
changes in the coal price then provides insight into how the ETS is affecting 
coal usage throughout our subsample of the EU, assuming that plant decision 
makers rationally factor in the price of the carbon permits when making their 
fuel purchase decisions. 
Coal usage has actually been on the rise in the EU, which has led some to 
conclude that the ETS is ineffective in this area. However, our estimates suggest 
that coal usage would have increased even more absent the ETS. In our pre-
ferred specification, we find that coal usage by large combustion plants in our 
sample countries decreases by around 0.360/0 when the price of coal increases by 
1%, holding constant the price of natural gas. At current coal prices and EUA 
prices, this suggests that coal usage by large combustion plants in our sample 
countries is about 7% lower than what it would be without the carbon price 
created through the ETS. Insofar as policymakers are concerned with reducing 
coal usage, these results should be informative. Although beyond the scope of 
this paper, there are other potential political and economic implications of 
reducing coal usage. For example, further research could investigate employ-
ment, revenue, and profit implications due to an increased relative price of coal. 
Our results suggest that the ETS has likely had a sizeable effect on the carbon 
emissions from coal-burning large combustion plants in the EU. To understand 
the net effect of this policy, further research is needed on how much substitution 
has occurred from burning coal to burning other carbon intensive fuels such as 
natural gas. However, since coal has higher carbon content than natural gas, it is 
likely that carbon emissions have decreased on the net even if there was sub-
stantial substitution from burning coal to burning natural gas. Furthermore, we 
find some evidence that plants with the ability to burn coal or natural gas are 
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more responsive to changes in fuel prices than are plants having only the ability 
to bum coal, as would be expected. But, we cannot rule out fuel switching that 
occurs at the firm level even when individual plants do not have the ability to 
switch fuel; this most likely occurs through changing the merit order of plants as 
one fuel becomes more expensive relative to the other. If one could get data 
providing both firm and plant information, it would be interesting to research just 
how much fuel switching occurs at the firm level. 
Our analysis herein is focused on the short-run but the long-run effects of a 
carbon price on large combustion plants also deserve more attention. For exam-
ple, how does investment in large combustion plants change in response to a 
carbon price? And, at what carbon price do firms decide to completely shut down 
coal burning plants and replace them with natural gas or another fuel source? 
These questions will be important to address as more data become available in the 
coming years. It is also important to investigate the behavior of coal-burning 
plants in countries that are not part of our sample due to a lack of coal price 
data to see how well the results generalize to the EU at large. We hope that 
researchers are inspired to look more closely into these important issues so that 
we can have a more comprehensive understanding of the impacts of the ETS. 
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